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(Forthcoming in Synthese) 
 
ACTIVE EXTERNALISM, VIRTUE RELIABILISM AND 
SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 
 
University of Edinburgh 
S. Orestis Palermos 
 
 
Abstract: Combining active externalism in the form of the extended and distributed 
cognition hypotheses with virtue reliabilism can provide the long sought after link between 
mainstream epistemology and philosophy of science. Specifically, by reading virtue reliabilism 
along the lines suggested by the hypothesis of extended cognition, we can account for 
scientific knowledge produced on the basis of both hardware and software scientific artifacts 
(i.e., scientific instruments and theories). Additionally, by bringing the distributed cognition 
hypothesis within the picture, we can introduce the notion of epistemic group agents, in order 
to further account for collective knowledge produced on the basis of scientific research teams.  
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Given that knowledge is a cognitive phenomenon, we should expect that philosophy of 
science, epistemology and cognitive science be interrelated in some way. In fact, in a series of 
recent papers, Ronald Giere (Giere 2002a; 2002b; 2006; 2007; Giere & Moffat 2003) has 
attempted to bring cognitive science and philosophy of science together. As far as the field of 
epistemology is concerned, however, Giere makes the following remark: “Philosophy of 
science illuminates the problems of epistemology but not much the other way around” (Giere 
2002b). This may be too strong, but the truth remains; philosophy of science and mainstream 
epistemology have so far been at odds—an awkward situation owing to the fact that the latter 
discipline has traditionally been individualistic whereas the former has been for the most part 
socially oriented.1  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Apart from some very few exceptions pointing towards the opposite direction (Goldman 2004, 2010; Fuller 2007, 
2012), for the most part, even the emerging field of social epistemology has so far focused on the individual epistemic 
subject, by studying only how individualistic knowledge is affected by social factors. For a general discussion of the 
field of social epistemology, the debate over its methodology, and its future see (Palermos & Pritchard 2013). For 
an extended discussion on the compatibility of contemporary approaches within cognitive science with 
contemporary accounts of knowledge and justification within mainstream and social epistemology, see (Carter et 
al. 2014). Non-mainstream approaches to social epistemology (e.g., Science and Technology Studies and the 
Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (Barnes, Bloor, & Henry, 1996; Bloor, 1991; Latour, 1999, 2007; Latour & 
Woolgar, 1986)) can, no doubt, also prove relevant to bridging the gap between epistemology and philosophy of 
science and cognitive science. In what, follows, however, we will need to bracket such approaches in order to save 
space for the discussion of mainstream epistemology, which is the primary focus of the present paper.   
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Why this methodological tension? In conceiving of knowledge—typically the primary 
focus of epistemology—as a cognitive (i.e., mental) phenomenon, mainstream epistemology 
has traditionally focused on the individual cognitive agent and the cognitive processes that lie 
under her skin. Cognition after all—it is largely held—rests within the individual’s head. 
Accordingly, to account for knowledge, one should focus on the cognitive/epistemic 
properties of the individual agent. To the contrary, far from being an individualistic enterprise 
that rests solely on the internal mental powers of individual scientists, the process of science 
relies heavily on scientific instruments and social structures and institutions (hardly anyone 
can deny the social and artificially scaffolded nature of the scientific process, especially after 
the publication of Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, in 1962). 
Indeed, it may even be argued that the gap between scientific knowledge (which 
heavily relies on scientific instruments and collaborative research teams) and the rest of the 
processes of knowledge-acquisition that mainstream epistemology has traditionally focused on 
(e.g., perception, memory, testimony and so on) is so big that no single, unified 
epistemological approach could account for them all—maybe, it could be further argued, 
there are several kinds of propositional knowledge and some of them require special 
treatment. However compelling this may sound to some, here we will pursue the exact 
opposite line of thought; i.e., our epistemic intuitions pick out only one concept of knowledge 
that operates in every acknowledgement of a true belief as an instance of knowledge, and this 
is so, despite the fact that knowledge can be attained via disparate processes whose (physical) 
implementation may be entirely unrelated. Granted, in most cases, knowledge supervenes on 
flesh and grey matter alone; but other times, it arises out of the interaction of our bodies with 
epistemic artifacts, and occasionally it may even be the product of several organisms and their 
tools operating in tandem. Despite the wild disparity of the underlying processes, however, all 
of these cases result in a single type of knowledge and epistemology must find a way to 
abstract away from irrelevant considerations of physical implementation in order to capture 
what all these cases have in common.  
In effect, given the dissimilitude between individualistic and scientific knowledge, the 
ability to capture the latter can be thought of as a critical test for the adequacy of any 
mainstream account of knowledge. As we shall see, however, the trick for providing such a 
widely encompassing account of knowledge might not come from epistemology itself, but 
from doing epistemology with a different approach to cognition in mind—one that allows for 
cognition to extend or even be distributed to the social domain. 
We can bring the above points together by considering Giere again. Giere’s main 
goal in the aforementioned list of publications is to demonstrate how certain forms of 
externalist philosophy of mind, known as active externalism (and especially the extended and 
distributed cognition hypotheses), can make cognitive science pertinent to philosophy of 
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science (despite the fact that the former, just like traditional epistemology, has focused for the 
most part on the individual). Here, we will focus on the potential impact of externalist 
philosophy of mind on philosophy of science once again. The difference of the present 
approach, however, is that, this time, active externalism will act as a link between mainstream 
epistemology and philosophy of science, in order to provide a mainstream epistemological analysis 
of certain important aspects of the scientific process. Specifically, it will be argued that if we 
read virtue reliabilism—one of the most promising mainstream accounts of knowledge—along 
the lines suggested by the extended and distributed cognition hypotheses, we can reduce the 
gap between mainstream epistemology and philosophy of science in at least two ways.  
In some more detail, in section 2, we will introduce active externalism and virtue 
reliabilism, and we will explain how we can combine the two. In section 3, we will take 
advantage of this move to demonstrate how virtue reliabilism can account for knowledge 
produced on the basis of both hardware and software scientific artifacts (i.e., scientific 
instruments and theories), and we will discuss how this approach can reveal the hidden, social 
nature of certain instances of scientific knowledge that are normally thought to be solely down 
to the individual scientist. Finally, section 4 will introduce the idea of epistemic group agents 
in order to account for collective knowledge produced on the basis of scientific research 
teams. 
 
2. VIRTUE RELIABILISM AND ACTIVE EXTERNSALISM 
 2.1 Active Externalism 
As a general approach to the nature of mind, active externalism (Clark and Chalmers 1998; 
Clark 2007, 2008; Hutchins 1995; Theiner 2011; Wheeler 2005; Menary 2006, 2007; 
Rowlands 1999; Wilson 2000, 2004) is standardly contrasted with Putnam (1975) and Burge’s 
(1986) meaning, or passive externalism, as it concentrates on the aspects of the environment 
that drive one’s cognitive loops in an ongoing way. Focusing on the specifics, active externalism 
has appeared in the literature under several labels and formulations—e.g., the extended mind 
thesis (Clark and Chalmers 1998), cognitive integration (Menary 2007), environmentalism 
(Rowlands 1999), locational externalism (Wilson 2000, 2004), the hypothesis of extended 
cognition (Clark and Chalmers 1998), the hypothesis of distributed cognition (Hutchins 1999) 
and so on. Here, however, we will only concentrate on the latter two. 
Focusing on cognitive processing, the hypothesis of extended cognition is the claim that 
“the actual local operations that realize certain forms of human cognizing include inextricable 
tangles of feedback, feedforward and feed-around loops: loops that promiscuously criss-cross 
the boundaries of brain, body and world” (Clark 2007, sec. 2).  Cognitive processing can and 
(under the appropriate conditions) literally extends to the agent’s surrounding environment. 
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Think about solving a mathematical problem by using pen and paper (we will return to this 
example in §3), or perceiving a chair through a tactile visual substitution system.2 According 
to the hypothesis of extended cognition, the involved artifacts are proper parts of the ongoing 
cognitive processing.  
However provocative this claim may sound, the hypothesis of distributed cognition 
(Hutchins, 1995; Theiner et al., 2010; Theiner and O’Connor, 2010; Sutton et al., 2008; 
Wilson, 2005; Heylighen et al., 2007) may sound more challenging still. According to this 
form of active externalism, cognitive processing may not just be extended beyond the agent’s 
head or organism but even distributed amongst several individuals along with their epistemic 
artifacts. Despite its more radical conclusion, however, the hypothesis of distributed cognition 
differs from the hypothesis of extended cognition only in that, this time, cognitive processes 
and the resultant cognitive systems extend to include not only artifacts but other individuals as 
well.  
With respect to argumentative lines, active externalism, especially in the form of the 
extended mind thesis, has been traditionally associated with common-sense functionalism 
(Braddon-Mitchell & Jackson, 2006). It has been recently argued (Chemero 2009, Palermos 
2014a, Carter et al. 2014), however, that contrary to the extended mind thesis, the focus of the 
extended and distributed cognition hypotheses is not on mental states (such as beliefs and 
desires, understood in common-sense functionalist terms), but on extended (and distributed) 
dynamical cognitive processes and the overall cognitive systems these processes give rise to. 
Accordingly, the extended and distributed cognition hypotheses do not need to rely for their 
support on common-sense functionalism; instead, they can be motivated on the basis of 
Dynamical Systems Theory (DST)—perhaps, the most powerful, if not the only, 
mathematical framework for studying the behavior of dynamical systems, in general.3   
According to this conceptual framework, in order to claim that two (or more) systems 
give rise to some extended or distributed process and, thereby, to an overall extended or 
distributed system (either way, to a coupled system, in DST terms), what is required is the 
existence of non-linear relations that arise out of continuous reciprocal interactions between the 
contributing parts (Chemero, 2009; Froese et al., 2013; Sutton et al., 2008; Theiner et al., 
2010; Theiner & O’Connor, 2010; Wegner et al., 1985; Tollefsen & Dale, 2011; Palermos 
2014a). This is because the aforementioned non-linear relations give rise to an overall non-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See Bach-y-Rita and Kercel (2003) for a recent review on TVSS. 
3 See also (Shani, 2013), whose view—viz., moderate active externalism—is similar to what we here call the 
hypothesis of extended cognition (though note that Shani’s arguments do not so heavily rely on DST, and his view 
is stronger than the hypothesis of extended cognition in that it denies—instead of remaining silent on the matter—
the extension of (common-sense functionalist) mental states. For more details on why common-sense functionalism 
is necessary for the extended mind thesis, but not the extended and distributed cognition hypotheses, see (Palermos 
2014a). Again though, note that the hypotheses of extended and distributed cognition are neither incompatible 
with common-sense functionalism, nor anti-functionalist on the whole. In so far as a cognitive process is a function, 
these two hypotheses are compatible with functionalism. 
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decomposable system that consists of all the contributing subcomponents. In some more 
detail, two reasons for postulating the overall system is that the aforementioned non-linear 
interactions (1) give rise to new systemic properties that belong only to the overall system and 
to none of the contributing systems alone (therefore one has to postulate the overall extended 
or distributed system) and (2) prevent one from decomposing the two systems in terms of 
distinct inputs and outputs from the one subsystem to the other (therefore one cannot but 
postulate the overall system) (Palermos 2014a).4  Accordingly, on the basis of dynamical 
systems theory, we can claim that in order to have an extended or even distributed cognitive 
system—as opposed to a cognitive system that is merely embedded in the sense of being 
dependent on, but not constituted by, certain environmental aspects (cf. Adams & Aizawa, 
2001, 2010; Rupert, 2004, 2009)—all we need is that the contributing parts (i.e., the relevant 
cognitive agents and their artifacts) interact continuously and reciprocally with each other.5 
 
 2.2 Virtue Reliabilism 
To introduce active externalism within contemporary epistemology we need an account of 
knowledge that places in its center the notion of cognitive ability, but in a way that is neutral 
as to whether cognitive abilities are supposed to be realized within the agent’s organismic 
boundaries or not. As luck would have it, however, there is already such an account on offer, 
viz., virtue reliabilism (see Greco 1999, 2004, 2007, 2010; Pritchard 2010b; Palermos & 
Pritchard 2013; Palermos 2011; Palermos 2014b; Palermos forthcoming).6 
According to virtue reliabilism, knowledge is creditable true belief, which is creditable 
because it is true in virtue of the manifestation of cognitive ability. On this view, cognitive ability is 
understood as a reliable belief-forming process that has been appropriately integrated into the 
agent’s cognitive character, where the agent’s cognitive character mainly consists of the 
agent’s cognitive faculties of the brain/central nervous system (CNS), including her natural 
perceptual faculties, her memory, and the overall doxastic system. In addition, however, it can 
also consist of “acquired skills of perception and acquired methods of inquiry including those 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4Note that the argument of this approach moves from the existence of extended/distributed cognitive processes to 
the existence of extended/distributed cognitive systems. There are some alternative approaches to active 
externalism available in the literature, however, that seem to focus either on the relevant extended systems (e.g., 
(Gelder, 1995; Haugeland, 1993, 2000) or on the relevant extended processes (Menary, 2013), alone.   
5 To preempt a possible worry, here, the relevant reciprocal interactions need only be continuous during the 
operation of the relevant coupled cognitive system and the unfolding of any processes related to it. For example, if, 
as part of her job and during normal working hours, individual S participates in distributed cognitive system X, S 
does not need to continuously interact with the other members of X, when she is at home. However, whenever X is 
in operation, S must continuously and reciprocally interact with the rest of the X-members. For more details on 
how dynamical systems theory, in general, can help us clearly distinguish between the hypothesis of extended 
cognition and the hypothesis of embedded cognition as well as avoid several other worries with respect to the 
hypothesis of extended cognition (e.g., the ‘cognitive bloat’ worry and the ‘causal-constitution’ fallacy), see 
(Palermos 2014a). 
6 There are several other proponents of virtue reliabilism—most famously Sosa (1988; 1993; 2007). The reason 
why only the above references have been included in the main text is to indicate a specific lineage of virtue 
reliabilism that is particularly apt for our present purposes. In the beginning of the line, however, is Greco, who 
has, himself, been heavily influenced by Sosa’s alternative.  
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involving highly specialized training or even advanced technology” (Greco 1999, 287).7 Here 
is a relatively weak formulation of virtue reliabilism we can work with: 
 
COGAweak   
 
If S knows that p, then S’s true belief that p is the product of a reliable belief-forming process, 
which is appropriately integrated within S’s cognitive character such that her cognitive success 
is to a significant degree creditable to her cognitive agency (Pritchard 2010b, 136-7). 8 
 
The reason why virtue reliabilists turn to an account of knowledge that stresses the creditable 
nature of the cognitive success (i.e., believing the truth) as well as its origin in the agent’s 
cognitive ability has to do with knowledge-undermining epistemic luck involved in Gettier 
cases. As Gettier demonstrated, one’s justified belief may turn out to be true without thereby 
counting as an instance of knowledge.  In the typical scenario, one’s belief, which is the 
product of a defective justificatory process, just happens to be true for reasons that are 
extraneous to one’s justification: In a lucky turn of events, one’s belief, which would otherwise 
be false (given it is produced in a defective way), turns out to be true. Contrast this with cases 
of success through the manifestation of ability. “There is a sense of ‘luck’ on which lucky 
success is precisely opposed to success through virtue or ability” (Greco 2007, 58). When one’s 
true belief is the product of the manifestation of one’s ability then believing the truth cannot 
have been lucky; of course, one may still be lucky to believe anything at all (because, say, one 
could have easily been killed), but believing the truth is not lucky itself. Accordingly, and since 
credit is normally attributed in cases of success through ability, virtue reliabilists hold that 
when some agent knows, his belief must be true because of cognitive ability, such that the success be 
creditable to him.  
 In other words, virtue reliabilists want to accentuate the importance of the way one 
arrives at one’s true belief, i.e., the process of getting things right. It is not enough that one forms 
one’s belief on the basis of virtue (i.e., ability) and that one’s belief be true: The mere 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 It should be noted that the notion of one’s ‘cognitive character’ as employed by virtue reliabilists is a technical 
notion, whose meaning may seem counterintuitive to our common-sense understanding of one’s character as 
consisting of general traits, such as open-mindedness, wisdom, courage, honesty, understanding, empathy and the 
like. In fact, within mainstream epistemology, there are two main ways in which one can understand intellectual 
virtues and character: 1) in terms of general ‘trait-virtues’, such as open-mindedness, honesty, understanding and 
so on and 2) in terms of specialized ‘faculty-virtues’, such as memory, perception, reasoning and so on. (Zagzebski, 
1996) is a typical example of the former approach and (Greco, 1999, 2010) of the latter. For the distinction 
between these two approaches to intellectual virtues and thereby character, see (Baehr, 2006) and (Greco & 
Zagzebski, 2000). Since it is the second approach to virtues—in terms of faculties and cognitive abilities—that 
informs the virtue reliabilist’s sense of one’s ‘cognitive character’, in what follows, the agent’s ‘cognitive character’ 
refers to the agent’s set of cognitive faculties (as opposed to general, ‘trait-virtues’).  
8 This is a weak formulation of virtue reliabilism for two reasons. First, because it is only a necessary condition on 
knowledge (several epistemologists hold that virtue reliabilism is a necessary component, but to have an adequate 
theory of knowledge, they argue, it must be further supplemented by either the safety or the sensitivity principle. 
(Pritchard 2010a)). Second, because, in order to also accommodate testimonial knowledge (Pritchard 2010b), it 
requires that one’s cognitive success be significantly, as opposed to primarily, creditable to one’s cognitive agency. 
Accordingly, ‘COGAweak’  stands for ‘weak COGnitive Agency’ to indicate that this is an account of knowledge, 
which requires that one’s cognitive success be creditable to one’s cognitive agency only to a significant (as opposed 
to primary) degree. For more details, see (Pritchard 2010b). 
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conjunction of these two conditions does not preclude Gettier cases from counting as 
knowledge. Virtue reliabilists, instead, focus on the relation between these two conditions. In 
order to know, getting to the truth of the matter must be creditable to one and for that to be 
the case, one must believe the truth because of one’s cognitive ability. Put another way, it is only 
when one’s true believing reveals the manifestation of one’s ability that one’s true belief can be 
creditable to one (and thereby constitute knowledge). Therefore, it should be no surprise 
that—and we should mark this to better appreciate the arguments to follow—virtue reliabilists 
put particular weight on the process via which one arrives at the truth (as opposed to merely 
believing something that also is, or happens to be, true).  
Now, as we mentioned before, according to virtue reliabilism, in order for a belief-
forming process to count as a cognitive ability it must be part of the agent’s cognitive 
character. So what could it be required in order for a process to be so integrated? As far as 
common-sense intuitions are concerned, Greco (1999, 2010) has noted that the relevant 
belief-forming process must be neither strange nor fleeting (i.e., it must be a normal, 
dispositional cognitive process). Despite such broad intuitions, however, Greco has noted in 
later work (2010) that in order for a process to be appropriately integrated within one’s 
cognitive character it must interact cooperatively with it. Specifically he writes: “cognitive 
integration is a function of cooperation and interaction, or cooperative interaction with other 
aspects of the cognitive system” (2010, 152).  
 The reason why Greco spells out ‘cognitive integration’ and ‘cognitive character’ in 
this way has to do with a minimal notion of epistemic responsibility/subjective justification. 
Specifically, Greco is after a notion of subjective justification, which is inline with epistemic 
externalism in that it denies that in order to be subjectively justified/epistemically responsible 
one needs to have access to the reasons for which one’s beliefs are reliable. Unfortunately, 
going into the details of how the integrated nature of one’s cognitive character can allow one 
to be justified in absence of any positive reasons for one’s belief is beyond the scope of the 
present paper, but the main idea is this:	  9 If one’s belief-forming process cooperatively 
interacts with other aspects of one’s cognitive system, then it can be continuously monitored 
in the background such that if there is something wrong with it, then the agent will be able to 
notice this and respond appropriately. Otherwise—if the agent has no negative beliefs about 
his/her belief-forming process—he/she can be subjectively justified in employing the relevant 
process by default, even if he/she has absolutely no positive beliefs as to whether or why it 
might be reliable. In other words, on virtue reliabilism, provided that one’s belief-forming 
process is integrated to one’s cognitive character such that one would be in a position to be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 For a detailed overview of the epistemic internalism/externalism debate and how it maps onto the internalism/ 
externalism debate within philosophy of mind see [(Carter et al. 2014). For a detailed analysis of the above 
minimal yet epistemically adequate notion of subjective justification/epistemic responsibility and its relation to 
cognitive integration see (Palermos 2014b). 
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responsive were there something wrong (with the process), one can be subjectively justified in 
holding the resulting beliefs merely by lacking any negative reasons against them. 
 
 2.3 Virtue Reliabilism and Active Externalism 
It has been previously argued that reading virtue reliabilism along the lines suggested by the 
extended cognition hypothesis is not only an available option (see Pritchard 2010b; Palermos 
& Pritchard 2013), but actually necessary for accounting for many instances of knowledge 
acquired via the employment of epistemic artifacts (Palermos 2011; Palermos 2014b).  Here 
we will only make a few remarks about the strong compatibility between the two views, as the 
present goal is to demonstrate how their combination can be turned to our advantage, 
especially with respect to understanding scientific knowledge acquired on the basis of 
epistemic instruments. 
To start with, first notice that there is nothing in the formulation of COGAweak or in 
the concepts involved thereof that restricts knowledge-conducive cognitive abilities to 
processes within the agent’s head. To the contrary, the idea of a cognitive character that may 
consist of “acquired methods of inquiry including those involving highly specialized training 
or even advanced technology” seems to be compatible with, or even prefigure, the hypothesis 
of extended cognition.  
If we focus on the details of the two theories, however, we can make a much stronger 
claim. Specifically, both theories put forward the same condition in order for a process to 
count as part of the agent’s cognitive system/character (and, thereby, by the lights of virtue 
reliabilism, as knowledge-conducive): Just as proponents of extended cognition claim that a 
cognitive system is integrated when its contributing parts engage in reciprocal interactions 
(independently of where these parts may be located), so Greco claims that cognitive integration 
of a belief-forming process (be it internal or external) is a matter of cooperative interaction 
with other parts of the cognitive system.10   
We see, then, that both in epistemology and philosophy of mind and cognitive 
science, satisfaction of the same criterion (cooperative interaction with other aspects of the 
agent’s cognitive system) is required for a process to be integrated into an agent’s cognitive 
system and thereby count as knowledge-conducive. Accordingly, there is no principled 
theoretical bar disallowing extended belief-forming processes from counting as knowledge-
conducive. An agent may extend his cognitive character by incorporating epistemic artifacts 
to it.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Elsewhere (Palermos 2011; 2014b), it has been argued that both theories put also forward the same broad, 
common sense functionalist intuitions on what is required from a process to count as a cognitive ability. Briefly, 
both views state that the process must be (a) normal and reliable, (b) one of the agent’s habits/dispositions and (c) 
integrated into the rest of the agent’s cognitive character/system. 
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So, for example, in this way, we can explain how a subject might come to know the 
position of a satellite on the basis of a telescope, while holding fast to the idea that knowledge 
is belief that is true in virtue of cognitive ability.11 Even though the belief-forming process in 
virtue of which the subject believes the truth is for the most part external to his organismic 
cognitive agency, it still counts as one of his cognitive abilities, as it has been appropriately 
integrated into his cognitive character.12 Moreover, the subject satisfies COGAweak, since his 
believing the truth is significantly creditable to his cognitive agency (i.e., his organismic 
cognitive apparatus): It is the subject’s organismic cognitive faculties that are first and 
foremost responsible for the recruitment, sustaining, and monitoring of the extended belief-
forming process (i.e., telescopic observation), in virtue of which the truth with respect to the 
satellite’s position is eventually arrived at. 
In cases like this, therefore, even though it is the external component that accounts (at 
least in big part) for the truth-status of the agent’s belief, the agent’s cognitive agency—i.e., his 
organismic cognitive faculties—is still significantly creditable for integrating and sustaining the 
relevant external component into his cognitive system. In other words, in accordance with the 
demands of COGAweak, even though believing the truth is the product of some extended 
cognitive process, the agent’s cognitive success is still significantly creditable to his organismic 
cognitive faculties: Just as Clark suggest, “human cognitive processing (sometimes) extends to 
the environment surrounding the organism. But the organism (and within the organism the 
brain/CNS) remains the core and currently the most active element. Cognition is organism 
centered [even] when it is not organism bound” (Clark 2007, sec. 9).  
 
3. THE EXTEDED COGNITION HYPOTHESIS AND SCIENTIFIC 
KNOWLEDGE 
To recap, an epistemic agent’s cognitive character—i.e., her cognitive system—may extend 
beyond her organismic cognitive faculties that make up her cognitive agency, by 
incorporating belief-forming processes, which rely for the most part on environmental 
elements. The way to test whether such external processes have been integrated into the 
agent’s cognitive character is to check whether by employing them the agent engages in 
continuous reciprocal interactions with them—whether, that is, he delivers outputs on their 
basis, which recycled as inputs drive her cognitive loops along. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Making observations through a telescope clearly qualifies as a case of cognitive extension as it is a dynamical 
process that involves ongoing reciprocal interactions between the agent and the artifact. Moving the telescope 
around, while adjusting the lenses, generates certain effects (e.g., shapes on the lens of the telescope), whose 
feedback drives the ongoing cognitive loops along. Eventually, as the process unfolds, the coupled system of the agent 
and his telescope is able to identify—that is, see—the target satellite.  
12 On the basis of the feedback loops between the agent and his artifact (see the footnote above). 
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So depending on whether the above criterion is met, the employment of hardware 
external elements such as calculators, microscopes, telescopes, TVSS and so on can 
occasionally qualify as genuine hardware extensions of one’s cognitive character. It should be 
interesting, however, to ask whether something analogous applies to what would count as 
software extensions.  
 
 3.1 Languages as Software Extensions 
From the point of view of the hypothesis of extended cognition, the development of language 
might have been, to a certain degree, the outcome of the humans’ need to externalize their 
thoughts to the public space so that they can more easily manipulate them. 
Drawing on Vygotsky’s  (1986; 1978) ideas as vindicated by recent bodies of 
developmental research,13 Clark suspects that self-directed speech (be it vocal or silent inner 
rehearsal) is a crucial cognitive tool that allows us to highlight the most puzzling features of 
new situations, and to direct and control our own problem-solving actions (Clark 1998, 164). 
Of course, as he further notes, the effect of language on human thought needs not be 
restricted to speech, since written language may have similar, and possibly more powerful, 
results.14 For example, as I write down this paper, Clark would note,  
I am continually creating, putting aside, and re-organizing chunks of text. I have a file, which 
contains all kinds of hints and fragments, stored up over a long period of time, which may be 
germane to the discussion. I have source texts and papers full of notes and annotations. As I 
(literally, physically) move these things about, interacting first with one, then another, making 
new notes, annotations and plans, so the intellectual shape of the [paper] grows and solidifies. 
It is a shape which does not spring fully developed from inner cogitations. Instead, it is the 
product of a sustained and iterated sequence of interactions between my brain and a variety of 
external props (Clark 1998, 173). 
     
Briefly, the main idea is that language in general, and words in particular, enable us 
to capture abstract ideas and rich experiences in memory. This has the direct effect of 
allowing thoughts to become objects of further attention and reflection, opening them up to a 
range of further mental operations. This feedback of one’s thoughts to one’s own cognitive system gives 
rise to the distinctively human capacity of meta-cognition, or, as Clark calls it, “second order 
cognitive dynamics” (1998, 177).  
Moreover, this capacity to externalize one’s thoughts in recyclable linguistic 
representations could be far more active and transformative than one may initially think, since 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 See (Berk & Garvin 1984). See also (Bamberger & Brofsky, 1979; Olson, 1996a,1996b; Tomasello, 2009; 
Wertsch, 1988) 
14 Following Olson (2002; 1996a) (who draws on (Goody 1986, 1987) and (Shankweiler & Liberman, 1972)), and 
contrary to (De Saussure, 1916/1983) and Bloomfield (1933), we should here note that writing may not be the 
mere transcription of speech, but a language in its own right. For ideas similar to Olson’s see (Harris 1986) and 
Linnell (2005). For a discussion of how they fit into the current debate over active externalism, see (Theiner 2013) 
and (Theiner 2011, ch. 4).  
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the particular linguistic abilities one possesses may guide or restrain one’s ongoing trains of 
thought in a profound way. Take the construction of a poem for example:  
 
We do not simply use the words to express thoughts. Rather, it is often the properties of the 
words (their structure and their cadence), which determine the thoughts that the poem comes 
to express. A similar partial reversal can occur during the construction of complex texts and 
arguments. By writing down our ideas we generate a trace in a format that opens up a range 
of new possibilities. We can then inspect and re-inspect the same ideas, coming at them from 
many different angles and in many different frames of mind (Clark 1998, 176).   
   
The moral, Clark claims, is that public language and text play more than just a 
preserving-and-communicating-ideas role; “instead, these external resources make available 
concepts, strategies and learning trajectories which are simply not available to individual un-
augmented brains. Similarly, Olson (2002, 160) notes that the invention of a notational system 
involves  “the creation of a new conceptual scheme with new possibilities for thinking.” 
Musical scores, for example, allow one to think about musical structure in a new way and, 
mathematical notations may constitute important building blocks at the foundations of 
mathematics (Chemla, 2012). Language in other words, does not only facilitate existing 
mental capacities but creates the possibility for new ones. In Olson’s words (ibid., 161), 
“inventing a new writing system and learning to deal with a writing system is not just a matter 
of improved storage and communication of information but a new form of representation, 
thought and consciousness.”    
Much of the true power of language, in other words, “lies in the underappreciated 
capacity to re-shape the computational spaces which confront intelligent agents” (Clark 1998). 
In what ways does language do this? Some of its distinctively transformative effects on our 
biological cognitive systems, as Clark (1998, 169-173) enumerates them, are the following 
ones: memory augmentation, attention and resource allocation, and manipulation and 
representation of data. 
 Interestingly, in a somewhat similar vein, but drawing inspiration from complex 
systems and chaos theory, Logan (2003; 2006; 2008) presents the controversial yet promising 
idea that speech is the first proper language embedded in an evolutionary series of languages, 
preceded by pre-verbal proto-languages (tool making, social intelligence, and mimetic 
communication), and followed by more task or domain specific languages, such as written 
language, mathematics and science. According to this picture, each new language emerged 
from the previous forms of language as a bifurcation to a new level of order in response to an 
information overload that the previous set of languages couldn’t handle. And similarly to 
Clark, Logan accentuates the transformative effects of words (in the form of both utterances 
and signs) on our biological faculties: 
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A concept in the form of a word links many percepts of an individual and, hence, extends the 
brain’s capacity to remember. Words as concepts are a form of artificial memory which creates 
artificial connections. Words bring order to a chaotic mind filled with memories of a myriad of 
experiences. Language is an emergent order (Logan 2006, 153).  
 
So just like Clark, Logan, too, holds that language serves two and not just one fundamental 
function; obviously, it is a form of (i) communication, but it is a form of (ii) information-
processing, as well. 
Overall, then, we get the following picture with respect to language: Language allows 
agents to not only communicate with each other but also think about their own thoughts and 
transform their minds, on the basis of mutual interactions with linguistic elements (e.g., 
symbols in the form of utterances or written signs). These self-generated cognitive loops allow 
agents to extend their cognitive characters beyond the first-order, percept based (at least on 
Logan’s view),15 cognitive dynamics that their organismic cognitive capacities initially provide 
them with. But is language or, more accurately, public language and text the only software 
external artifacts that cognitive agents use so as to extend their cognitive characters in such a 
way?  
 
 3.2 Scientific Theories as Software Extensions 
As we briefly mentioned before, Logan claims that 
[S]peech, writing, math, science, and computing form an evolutionary chain of languages. 
Each of these activities can be considered as a separate language because each allows us to 
think differently, create new ideas and develop new forms of expression. Another 
consideration is that each of these five forms of language possesses its own unique semantics 
and syntax and hence qualifies as a language in itself according to criteria set by classical 
linguistics (2003, 3).  
 
Here we will only concentrate on the interesting case of scientific theories.16 One way to 
interpret the above quote is by taking Logan to refer to the (social) practice of speech, writing, 
math and science as languages. On further reflection, however, his remark about the necessity 
for unique semantics and syntax in order for a system to qualify as a language in itself 
indicates that it is specific verbal and written languages, as well as particular scientific theories, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 In his (2008), Logan claims that our primitive, biological cognitive capacities are all percept-based and that it is 
only with the advent of language that we acquired concepts. On the face of this it would seem that his approach is 
a form of concept empiricism. But this may turn out to not stand upon further reflection: First, the debate over 
empiricism versus rationalism can be construed in several ways ((Markie, 2013), see also (Weiskopf, 2007) for a 
recent defense of several weak versions of empiricism, as informed by neuroscientific evidence)); second, and 
against the background of all these dialectical possibilities, Logan stresses the deeply transformative effects of 
language on thought, indicating that as thought evolves in response to the transformative effects of language, it 
may develop into something that is more than just its perceptual origins. 
16 In what follows, I do not draw a clear distinction between theories and their models. The two most prevailing 
views about the relation between models and theory are 1) the syntactic view (associated with the logical positivists) 
and 2) the semantic view (Suppes 1961; 1967; Suppe, 1977; van Fraasen,1980; Giere, 1988). Both of these views 
understand the relation between models and theory as a particularly close one. According to the syntactic view, 
models are dictated by theories, whereas on the semantic view, theories just are families of models. Recently 
however, Morgan and Morrison (1999) have put forward a third alternative according to which models are 
‘autonomous agents’ in the sense that they are not entirely reliant either on theories or on the world they are meant 
to represent. For more details, see (Morgan and Morrison 1999, ch. 2).  
	   13	  
that he actually refers to as languages. And if Logan is right, such that we can indeed view 
specific scientific theories as languages and thereby as software artifacts too, we can take this 
to be a first indication that, according to the hypothesis of extended cognition and virtue 
reliabilism, scientific theories could also count as belief-forming processes that can extend the 
epistemic agent’s cognitive character beyond his organismic cognitive faculties. In the next 
section we will start exploring this possibility by considering a further hint on why scientific 
theories should be seen as software cognitive artifacts that can extend our organismic 
cognitive capacities. Then we will conclude the argument by considering some specific 
examples in §3.2.2. 
 
 3.2.1 A Hint: Observations are theory-laden 
A hint that scientific theories can constitute software cognitive extensions along the lines 
suggested above comes from the old problem of the theory-ladenness of observations. Briefly 
speaking, the validity of scientific theories depends on their accordance with empirical 
observations. It has been claimed, however, that observation involves perception as well as 
other underlying cognitive processes. As Kuhn claims, “something like a paradigm is a 
prerequisite to perception itself. What a man sees depends both upon what he looks at and 
what his previous visual-conceptual experience has taught him to see” (1962, 113). 
Observations heavily depend on some underlying understanding (which stems from the 
already existing scientific theories and commonsensical habits of thought) of the way in which 
the world functions; and that understanding influences what is perceived, noticed, or deemed 
trustworthy of consideration. Therefore, the argument goes, since empirical observations 
presuppose a theoretical understanding, they cannot be the final arbiters of the validity of 
scientific theories.  
 Historically, the issue first emerged between Hempel (1966; 1970), who defended the 
distinction between observational and theoretical terms, and Hanson (1961; 1969) who 
maintained the theory-laden thesis of observation. Specifically, according to Hanson, not only 
are the observational sentences theory-laden but the observations themselves are theory-laden 
(1969): 
 
In short we usually “see” through spectacles made of our past experience, our knowledge, and 
tinted and molted by the logical forms of our special languages and notations. Seeing is what I 
shall call a “theory-laden” operation, about which I shall have increasingly more to say.  
 
 Famously, the debate also has a counterpart in the philosophy of mind, as it was taken 
up by Churchland (1979; 1988; 1989) and Fodor (1984; 1988). Fodor, by appealing to 
illusions such as the Muller-Lyer experiment whereby the subjects’ knowledge of the illusion 
does not alter their defective impressions, thinks that perceptual processes are modular (i.e., 
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independent, closed, domain-specific processing modules). So, by definition, bodies of theory 
that are inaccessible to the modules do not affect the way the perceiver sees the world. 
Churchland, on the other hand, relying on studies such as those utilizing the ambiguous 
pictures of rabbit/duck and young/old woman, argues that higher cognitive processes can 
have an impact on visual processes. Specifically, higher order theories provide the agents with 
internal representations, which pick out important distinctions and structures in the external 
world. When the input to the agent’s perceptual processes is variegated, or noisy, and thereby 
not clearly represented, these representations allow the agent to “respond to those inputs in a 
fashion that systematically reduces the error messages to a tickle. These I need hardly remind, 
are the functions typically ascribed to “theories”” (1989, 177). 
 Considerations such as those of Hanson and Churchland have been widely thought to 
produce a relativistic picture of science—and possibly epistemology as well—whose most 
prominent proponents are thought to be Feyerabend (1975) and Kuhn (1962) (the latter quite 
possibly unjustly though). As one of Kuhn’s most infamous passages goes: “In so far as [the 
scientists’] recourse to that world is through what they see and do, we may want to say that 
after a revolution scientists respond to a different world” (1962, 110). Fortunately, however, 
modern cognitive psychology points away from relativism, at least as far as the theory-
ladenness of observations is concerned—even though the phenomenon is not altogether 
denied.   
 In particular, Anna Estany (2001, 208) holds that  
The beliefs of the higher or more fundamental level influence how perceptual units are 
interpreted by the lower levels [...] Humans use both types of processes in perception because 
each have characteristic advantages and disadvantages. Thanks to top-down processes we can 
recognize patterns with incomplete or degraded information. Moreover, top-down processes 
make perception faster, but they can induce us to make mistakes in a perception by relying on 
previous knowledge. 
 
Accordingly, our perceptual systems do get guidance from higher order expectations. As it has 
been further pointed out, however, when attention is caused by mismatches between 
expectation and reality the inputs from the arousal system constitute a “reset wave” making it 
possible not to fall into arbitrary, relativistic errors of perception (Estany 2008, 213). Similarly, 
Brewer and Lambert (2001), exploring the literature on relevant experiments, concede that 
“perception is determined by the interaction of top-down theory information and bottom-up 
sensory information” (178, emphasis added):  
However, note that in all of the above cases the stimuli were either ambiguous, degraded, or 
required a difficult perceptual judgment. In these cases the weak bottom-up information 
allowed the top-down influences to have a strong impact on perceptual experience. It seems 
likely that strong bottom-up information will override top-down information. [...] Thus, the 
top-down/bottom-up analysis allows one to have cases of theory-laden perception, but does not 
necessarily lead down the slippery slope of relativism.  
	   15	  
 Arguably, this sounds like a promising response to the question as to whether the 
theory-laden nature of observations leads to relativism. For the present purposes, however, the 
solution to this problem is less important than its very existence. For it shows that theories in 
general, and hence scientific theories too, can take the form of cognitive dispositions whose 
employment actively drives the agents’ cognitive character on the basis of reciprocal (top-
down-bottom-up) interactions between the two. This process of mutual interactions creates 
outputs (observations), which recycled as inputs drive the agent’s overall cognitive system 
along, producing in effect additional observations that will themselves be the basis of new (and 
hopefully, still empirically testable, as Estany, Brewer and Lambert argue) assumptions and so 
on. This theory-laden nature of the scientific process may sometimes lead to mistakes, but for 
the most part, when the input is ambiguous, noisy, or variegated it is an important facilitatory 
effect that boosts the scientists’ performance in several ways. In particular, Brewer and 
Lambert (ibid.) note that background theories affect not only the scientists’ perceptual processes 
but they also play a significant role in other aspects of the scientist’s cognitive and epistemic life 
including attention, data evaluation and interpretation, data production, memory, and 
communication. Interestingly, but not at all surprisingly on the present view (which takes 
scientific theories to be akin to languages if not languages themselves) these transformative 
effects of theories are strikingly similar to the effects that language has on biological cognition, 
according to Clark (see also §3.1); namely, memory augmentation, attention and resource 
allocation, and data manipulation and representation (Clark 1998, 169-173). 
 
 3.2.2 Extended Scientific Problem-Solving 
The discussion of the previous section was only intended as a hint that scientific theories may 
be seen as software artifacts that extend one’s cognitive character. Here is why: The main idea 
was that once one becomes fluent with a scientific theory, the way one perceives the world (in 
qualitative terms), the aspects of the world one attends to and considers worthy of 
consideration, and the way one stores and communicates one’s experiences will be 
fundamentally altered. In other words, scientific theories have a very strong impact on one’s 
point of view of the external world, allowing one to observationally interact with it in ways 
that would be otherwise unavailable and which, in turn, affect back the way one develops 
one’s theories (and so on). Scientific theories, moreover, are external in the sense that no one 
is born with them inscribed in one’s neural apparatus. Theories, instead, are acquired through 
a long period of training and practice during which scientists interact with teachers, 
professors, textbooks, scientific equipment, and so on. And once scientists become masters of 
such externally derived theories, the cognitive operations (including the observations) they are 
able to perform are qualitatively altered and significantly enhanced.  Hence, scientific theories 
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may be seen as external software epistemic artifacts that extend one’s cognitive character. 
Here is the wrinkle, however, and why the above can be nothing more than a hint: In order to 
resist this picture, the opponent of cognitive extension does not need to deny that once such 
external scientific theories are appropriately internalized will have dramatic effects on the 
epistemic agent’s cognitive loops. Crucially, however, he will further claim that all processing, 
including making theory-laden observations, will be exclusively performed within the 
scientist’s head. Why, then, should this count as a case of cognitive extension? 
 Clark, of course, is aware of this line of arguing against languages as software 
extensions, and this is why he does not restrict himself in claiming that all languages do is 
facilitate or enhance one’s inner processes of thought and reason. Instead, the examples Clark 
uses in order to illustrate his point involve agents who physically manipulate external linguistic 
symbols and representations so as to achieve cognitive tasks that would otherwise be 
infeasible. So are there any examples from the scientific domain, which could motivate the 
view that scientific theories can count as software artifacts that extend our cognitive capacities 
in a similar way? 17 
 In fact there are plenty, and soon we will start with one from mathematics. Before 
moving on to the actual example, however, a few preparatory remarks are in order: Drawing 
on McClelland et al. (1986), Giere and Moffat (2003) claim that human brain networks have 
evolved for and are best at completing and recognizing patterns in input provided by the 
environment (i.e., humans are excellent pattern-matchers). But if that’s correct, they ask, 
“how does man do the kind of linear symbol processing required for activities such as using 
language and doing mathematics”? (Giere and Moffat 2003, 302). “The answer given by 
McClelland et al. was that man does the kind of cognitive processing required for these 
activities by creating and manipulating external representations. These latter tasks can be 
done by a complex pattern-matcher” (ibid.). 
 So, with the above in mind, here is an example from mathematics: Think about a 
complex, say, three-digit multiplication problem such as 987 times 789. It is true that few if 
any of us can solve this problem by looking at or contemplating on it. We may only perform 
the multiplication process by using pen and paper to externalize the problem in symbols. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 As a referee also points out, several authors ( e.g.,Goody, 1977; Latour & Woolgar, 1986; Olson, 1996a; Tufte, 
2001) have in the past  claimed that symbolic representations play a crucial role in the development and 
visualization of scientific knowledge. These authors, however, have not advanced the strong claim that cognition is 
literally externalized, rather than heavily dependent on external tools and aids, along the lines suggested by the 
alternative hypothesis of embedded cognition (Adams& Aizawa 2001, 2010; Rupert, 2004, 2009). As noted in §2.1, 
however, the hypothesis of extended cognition should be clearly distinguished from the hypothesis of embedded 
cognition, which is a conservative view: On the present approach, scientific theories do not act as mere scaffolds of 
the epistemic agent’s internal cognitive capacities, but they are literally constitutive of the cognitive repertoire that 
makes up the agent’s cognitive character. Briefly, the reason, according to dynamical systems theory, is that when 
the dependence between the cognitive agent and the world is one-way, cognition is indeed merely embedded. 
When a cognitive system interacts reciprocally with some aspect of the world, however, then the two constitute a 
coupled system that consists of both of them. It is for this reason that, in what follows, the focus will be on cases 
whereby the epistemic agent mutually interacts in an ongoing way with external scientific symbols. 
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Then we can serially proceed to its solution by performing simpler multiplications, starting 
with 9 times 7, and externally storing the results of the process for use in later stages. The 
process involves eye-hand motor coordination and is not simply performed within the head of 
the person reciting the times tables. It involves intricate, continuous interactions between 
brain, hand, pen and paper, all the while it is being transparently regulated by the normative 
aspects of the notational/representational system involved—for instance, that we cannot 
multiply by infinity, that we must write the next digit under the second to last digit of the 
number above, what operation we must perform next and so on.18   
 Accordingly, mathematics (again, a language according to Logan’s view) can be seen 
as a software artifact that allows epistemic agents to literally extend their cognitive characters 
to the world and thereby transcend their limited organismic cognitive capacities. Of course, it 
may be objected that mathematics is not really a scientific theory, but the point is that if the 
above analysis is correct, very similar descriptions can be provided for any solution of some 
scientific problem, which involves the physical manipulation of external scientific symbols, 
formulas, or even graphs. 
 Take, for example, the use of chemical formulas in organic chemistry as introduced 
by Berzelius and later refined by Dumas, in the early nineteenth century: 
Assuming that the basic constituents in reactions are conserved, one can represent chemical 
reactions by equations in which the numbers of all constituents are the same on both sides of 
the equation. That is, the equation must balance. One can literally do theoretical chemistry by 
manipulating these symbols in the following example: (Giere & Moffatt 2003, 304) 
   
                         CH4+ 2O2 = CO2+ 2H2O     (The burning of methane)  
 
Such formulas are clearly external representations that form part of an extended cognitive 
system that allows scientists to explore possible reactions in organic chemistry. “That is, the 
cognitive process of balancing an equation does not take place solely in the head of some 
person, but consists of interactions between a person and physical, external representations” 
(ibid.).  
 Moreover, in relation to the above, recall the point we made in the previous 
subsection about how the scientific theories (or models) one already has in mind may affect 
the way one will further develop one’s theories and so on: Klein (1999) explains how Dumas, 
by modifying and using Berzelius’ chemical formulas as ‘paper tools’, came up with the notion 
of ‘substitution’, later to be developed into a new theory about the unitary structure of organic 
compounds. Specifically, she argues that it was the physical manipulations of these formulas and 
formula equations that led to the conception of the notion of substitution. And eventually, it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 For the importance of the normative aspects of the external representational systems in explaining cognition see 
(Menary 2007).  
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was through these formulas that the concept of substitution allowed Dumas to see the link 
between the theory of proportion and the notions of compound and reaction.19  
 So to return to the discussion of the transformative effects of science, the above is a 
clear example of a scientific theory that does not only alter the agent’s inner cognitive 
processes, but also allows him to externalize his problems in symbols, whose physical 
manipulation enables him to come up with solutions that, arguably, would otherwise be 
unavailable. This example, however, is only one out of a surprisingly large number of similar 
cases. In fact anyone who solved problems in mathematics, physics, chemistry, logic, geometry 
or even biology (recall the Mendelian inheritance trees) at school can come up with one’s own 
examples. 
 By actively driving (and constraining) the ongoing cognitive loops, scientific 
theories—like public language and text—can then be seen as software artifacts that allow the 
scientist’s cognitive character to literally extend beyond her natural cognitive capacities. As 
Lakatos once wrote, the “methodological falsificationist uses our most successful theories as extensions 
of our senses” (1970, 107, emphasis in the original).20 
 This all should be interesting in its own. In addition, however, and before closing this 
section, we should also note how such an understanding of scientific theories and artifacts is 
well-positioned to capture and reveal the inherently social nature of scientific knowledge, even 
when, apparently, this is solely down to the individual scientist. Previously, we noted that 
when an agent gains knowledge on the basis of a telescope, her cognitive success is 
significantly creditable to her cognitive agency on account of having appropriately integrated 
the artifact within her cognitive character. What about the rest of the credit, however? This is 
a fair worry, for, in such cases, the prevailing factor in the causal explanation of the agent’s 
cognitive success is the integrated extended belief-forming process that consists of both one’s 
cognitive agency and the epistemic artifact, operating in tandem. So, even though a (or even if 
the most) significant part of the credit has to be attributed to the agent’s internal cognitive 
capacities (i.e., his cognitive agency), at least some credit must also be attributed to the external 
aspects of the overall process. 
 Should we then attribute credit to telescopes, microscopes, calculators, languages, 
scientific theories and so on? It seems that the answer can’t be positive. To see why, consider 
that even though Greco (2004) holds that credit attributions are very much akin to causal 
explanations, attributions of responsibility, praise, or merely neutral action (i.e., attributions of 
positive, negative, or merely neutral credit, respectively) have been traditionally associated 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 An anonymous referee suggests that a similar example with an equally important impact on the development of 
further scientific theories is the case of Feynman diagrams. Similarly, Kaiser (2005, p. 156) accentuates their role 
by noting that “Feynman diagrams have revolutionized nearly every aspect of theoretical physics.” 
20 According to Lakatos, science and all scientists proceed on the basis of ‘sophisticated methodological 
falsificationism’, which is the methodological background against which he presented his rational reconstruction of 
science.   
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with intentional agents. Accordingly, the remaining credit should be attributed not to the 
artifacts themselves but to the individuals that intentionally brought the relevant extended 
belief-forming processes about. Notice further, however, that, frequently, we will not be able 
to attribute the rest of the credit to only one single individual, because, in most cases, a 
(potentially very large) number of individuals contributes to the development of such reliable 
belief-forming processes, by means of providing even more belief-forming (sub-) processes or 
data produced on their basis. Accordingly, many times, the remaining credit, i.e., the credit 
that is associated with the external portion of the epistemic agent’s extended cognitive ability, 
will be dispersed among a potentially large part of the agent’s epistemic community.21 
Overall, then, the view of scientific knowledge we get from the combination of COGAweak 
with the extended cognition hypothesis, is one, whereby to become a scientist, the individual 
needs a scientific community, able to supply him with the necessary reliable-belief forming 
processes that he can then integrate within his cognitive character so as to come to know the 
truth of some scientific proposition p.22 
 
4. THE DISTRIBUTTED COGNITION HYPOTHESIS AND SCIENTIFIC 
KNOWLEDGE 
 
So far, we have been focusing on the combination of virtue reliabilism with the extended 
cognition hypothesis. The advantages of introducing active externalism within virtue 
epistemology may not stop here, however. For example, we may further make the additional 
claim that there can be cognitive characters that do not just extend beyond an agent’s 
organismic capacities, but which are instead distributed amongst several agents along with their 
epistemic artifacts. 
 As mentioned before, the hypothesis of distributed cognition has been developed in 
parallel with the hypothesis of extended cognition (Hutchins 1995; Theiner et al., 2010; 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 One possible worry here is to ask whether the above distribution of credit suggests that we should also posit 
distributed cognitive systems that would be vastly extended not only in space but also back in time. This would be a 
rather awkward claim to make, but we can clearly answer in the negative: As noted in §2.1, in order to have an 
extended or distributed cognitive system we need that all the contributing members reciprocally (i.e., non-linearly) 
interact with each other. The dependency relations that give rise to the distribution of credit I refer to above, 
however, are all, one-way, linear ones. Accordingly, given the dynamical systems theory approach to extended and 
distributed cognition we here draw upon, we have no reason to think that the above distribution of credit requires 
to also posit distributed cognitive systems that may even extend back in time. Thanks to an anonymous referee for 
requesting me to clarify this potentially confusing point.      
22 Think about Newton’s infamous remark in a letter to his rival, Robert Hooke: 
 
What Descartes did was a good step. You have added much several ways and especially in taking the 
colours of thin plates into philosophical consideration. If I have seen further is by standing on the 
shoulders of Giants.  
 
Even if, as is often assumed, the above is in fact intended as a sarcastic remark (due to Hooke’s short build), the 
ambivalence that Newton takes advantage of derives from the truthfulness of the expression within the context it is 
uttered—that no matter the genius and the individual efforts of a scientist, his or her achievements will always rest 
upon and derive from the achievements of other scientists and in general the scientific community he or she is a 
part of.   
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Theiner & O’Cnnor, 2010; Sutton et al., 2008; Wilson, 2005; Heylighen et al., 2007) and 
differs from the latter position only in that, this time, the cognitive system extends to include 
epistemic artifacts as well as other agents. Moreover, most proponents of the view (Sutton et 
al. 2008; Theiner et al. 2010; Tollefsen and Dale 2011; Heylighen et al., 2007) point out that, 
again, it is the existence of non-linear, reciprocal interactions between the contributing members 
and their artifacts that is the criterion by which we can judge whether we have an integrated 
distributed cognitive system. Accordingly, by the lights of virtue reliabilism there could be 
knowledge-conducive cognitive characters/systems, which may nevertheless be distributed. 
 This is an interesting possibility, because it can allow us to account for epistemic group 
agents. Groups of individuals who exist and gain knowledge in virtue of a shared, common 
cognitive character that mainly consists of at least one distributed cognitive ability. Such a 
collective cognitive ability emerges out of the members’ mutual (socio-epistemic) interactions 
and is not reducible to the cognitive abilities possessed by the individual members, thereby 
allowing us to speak of a group agent in itself. This is important, because by being able to so 
conceptualize a group of people as a self-standing agent, we can then use the individualistic 
approach of virtue reliabilism in order to account for knowledge that is collectively produced 
and which is, thereby, distinctively social. 
 For example, we can use COGAweak to explain how a research team gains knowledge 
on the basis of an experiment. Even though the knowledge-conducive belief-forming process 
consists of several experts and their experimental devices engaging in reciprocal (socio-
epistemic) interactions, the collective cognitive success of believing the truth of some (scientific) 
proposition will still be significantly creditable to the group’s cognitive agency—i.e., the 
assembly of the organismic cognitive faculties of its individual members:  It is the assembly of 
these organismic cognitive faculties that is first and foremost responsible for the emergence 
and efficient sustaining of the collective’s belief-forming process. To paraphrase Clark, cognition 
is organism centered even when it is distributed. Crucially, however, given that any cognitive success 
that is collectively produced in this way will only be creditable to the collection of the members’ 
cognitive agencies as a whole and to none of the individual members alone, it won’t be known 
by any individual alone, but by the group agent as a whole. In other words, by combining an 
individualistic condition on knowledge, such as COGAweak, with the hypothesis of distributed 
cognition, we can make sense of the claim that p is known by G (the group agent), even though 
it is not known by any individual alone. 
 How is this possible and what does it mean, exactly? First, we must make clear what it 
doesn’t mean. To claim that a proposition p is known by the epistemic group agent as a whole, 
in the sense presented here, is not to claim that the relevant proposition is collectively known, 
because it is collectively believed (or ‘accepted’). This is an alternative approach to collective 
knowledge (see for example (Gilbert, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2010, Rolin 2008, List 2011, 
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Tuomela 2004)) that is not necessary to the present approach, and should be clearly 
distinguished from it. Of course, group knowledge, just as any other type of knowledge, will 
always involve belief in the proposition known, and the relevant belief must also, on some 
appropriate construal, qualify as the belief of the group. Nevertheless, whether the relevant 
belief (or acceptance) counts as the belief of the group, because it is of the summative or non-
summative type, the belief of some operative members of the group or merely the belief of a 
single representative (for an overview, see Tollefesen 2004) is an issue we do not here need to 
take a clear stance on—in point of fact, on the present account, any of these possibilities with 
respect to group belief may give rise to collective knowledge. 
To see why we do not here need to delve into the details of group belief in order to 
make the case for collective knowledge, remember that, as we noted in §3.1, virtue reliabilists 
accentuate the importance of the process via which one gets to the truth of the matter: One’s true belief 
is creditable to one, such that it can thereby constitute knowledge, only if one arrives at the 
truth in virtue of the belief-forming process (i.e., cognitive ability) one employed to form one’s 
belief. Accordingly, on the basis of virtue reliabilism, which accentuates the importance of the 
cognitive process via which one arrives at the truth, we can motivate collective knowledge on 
the basis of cases where arriving at the truth of some matter is the product of a collective 
belief-forming process. In other words, on the present, virtue reliabilist approach to collective 
knowledge, claiming that a group, as a whole, can have knowledge of a proposition p is not 
because the relevant proposition is collectively and irreducibly believed, but because getting to 
the truth of the matter as to whether p (or not-p) could only be collectively achieved and is thereby 
creditable only to the group as a whole.23 
 With all that said, however, we must further disambiguate the following subtle, yet 
important point: To claim that a proposition p constitutes, say, scientific knowledge that can only 
be had by a research team as a whole does not mean that p cannot also come to be known by 
individuals. For instance, claiming that the existence of the Higgs-boson can only be 
scientifically known by the ATLAS group at CERN does not mean that individual laypeople 
cannot come to know that the Higgs-boson exists, say by watching the news. The answer to 
how this is possible lies, again, in the virtue reliabilist’s emphasis on the process via which one 
gets to the truth of the matter. Given that one can truly believe a proposition on the basis of a 
multitude of different knowledge-conducive processes, it is possible that two individuals can know 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Similarly to fn. 22, one may worry that the present account overgeneralizes what may count as collective 
knowledge such that any case of interpersonal interaction may count as a case of collective knowledge. In response, 
each time, we need to ask the following questions: First, judging by the criterion of continuous reciprocal 
interactivity, is the relevant process a collective belief forming process? And, second, is the output of the relevant 
process a true belief? So, for example, asking for directions from a stranger and acquiring a true belief on that basis 
won’t count as collective knowledge, but merely as individual, testimonial knowledge, because the relevant process 
is merely a one-way, linear interpersonal interaction. In contrast, as I have previously noted elsewhere (Carter et al. 
2014) the products of transactive memory processes (Wegner et. al, 1985; Wegner, 1986)—provided that they are 
true—are typical cases of collective knowledge.      
	   22	  
that p all the while their knowledge of p is not the same; for instance one may have perceptual 
knowledge of p, whereas another person’s knowledge of p may be testimonial. To put the same 
point in terms of our previous example, it is possible that both the ATLAS group and a reader 
of Nature can know that the Higgs particle exists, and still it may be the case that this piece of 
knowledge is different in each case. The reader of Nature can only come to truly believe the 
relevant proposition on the basis of a testimonial chain at the beginning of which lies the 
scientific knowledge of ATLAS. Accordingly, her knowledge can only count as testimonial 
knowledge of a scientifically derived proposition; in order for such a scientific proposition to be 
known at all, however, such that it can then be testimonially transmitted, getting to its truth 
for the first time can only be the product of, and thereby creditable to, ATLAS (or a similar 
scientific research-team) as a whole.24 In other words, even though scientifically derived 
propositions such as “the Higgs particle exists” may be individually known on the basis of 
testimony, they may only be scientifically known by a research team as a whole.25  
 Actually, philosophers and anthropologists of science have already attempted to 
analyze knowledge produced on the basis of scientific experiments along lines very similar to 
the above. Think for example Cetina’s (1999) ethnographic study of high-energy physics 
experiments in CERN, or Giere’s descriptions of the Indiana University Cyclotron facility 
experiments (2002b; 2006) and observations made with the Hubble Telescope (2007). 
 It should be noted, however, that even though Giere wants to accentuate the 
distributed nature of the process that produces knowledge in such cases as well as the 
accompanying spread of epistemic responsibility in the form of credit (and why not, we may 
add, of blame as well?), he still wants to deny the existence of a distributed agent that knows. 
According to Giere, the reason for this contrast with what we claimed above—i.e., that there 
can indeed be cases where the subject of knowledge is an epistemic group agent or mind—is 
simple: “[C]ognitive agency is tightly bound up with related concepts such as that of 
intention, responsibility, consciousness, and in general having a mind in what is (sometimes 
derisively) called the ‘folk-psychological’ sense of  ’mind’” (2006, 715). And since clearly, as 
Giere further argues, such concepts do not apply to scientific experiments (though cf. Cetina 
1999), we should resist the idea of ‘distributed knowing’ or of a distributed epistemic agent in 
general. Instead, Giere suggests, we should opt for an “epistemology without a knowing 
subject” ((Giere 2007), quoting (Popper 1968)), according to which, in cases like the above, it 
is only correct to claim that “it has been scientifically established that p” (Giere 2002b) or that 
‘it is scientifically known that p’. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Unless the overall belief-forming process of the research team can somehow be technologically emulated.  
25 Thanks to two anonymous referees for Synthese, whose insightful comments helped clarify the points laid out in 
the above two paragraphs.   
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 Following the account on offer, however, may allow us to resist this impersonal image 
of scientific knowledge. Indeed, collaboratively produced scientific knowledge does not belong 
to any particular individual subject, S. Recall, however, that, on the present account, even such 
knowledge is still knowledge of a subject, G—the epistemic group agent: A result that is quite 
crucial from the point of view of mainstream epistemology, whose spirit has traditionally been 
methodologically individualistic (Goldman 2010, p.3), and which has always assumed that 
knowledge is knowledge of a subject. To see how the present approach can help mainstream 
epistemology resist the attempt to promote ‘epistemology without a knowing subject’ it is 
instructive to examine Giere’s appeal to common-sense psychology a bit closer. 
 To begin with, everyday discourse should actually make it clear that the idea of 
epistemic group agency does not really run against common sense. Claims such as ‘FBI knows 
that p’ (Goldman 2004) or that ‘the ATLAS research team knows that p’ are ubiquitously 
uttered in modern society.26 Moreover, even though it is true that not every aspect of a 
scientific experiment, or a group, in general, may have consciousness, intentions, or is 
responsible, these are not sufficient grounds for denying them the status of a group mind. 
After all, not every aspect of our minds is responsible, conscious or has intentions. Rather, 
only some parts of our cognitive systems (if any at all) bear these properties, and yet this is 
sufficient for the entirety of our cognitive systems to qualify as minds. Why then should the 
situation be any different in the case of groups? Courtesy the relevant aspects of their 
individual members, such collective systems will surely bear these properties too. 
 Of course, it may be objected that even so, what is still missing, but is necessary for 
groups to qualify as minds in themselves, is that groups possess these properties not at the 
‘sub- (individual) level but at the group level itself. Nevertheless, if we leave collective 
responsibility to the side for the moment—we will be returning to it shortly—closer inspection 
demonstrates that the objection cannot run very far either with the property of intentionality 
or the property of consciousness. With respect to the former—and remember that we do not 
here need to take a clear stance on the topic—‘collective intentionality’ has received 
considerable support by several prominent philosophers ( Gilbert, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2010; 
List, 2011; Pettit, 2002; List & Pettit, 2006; Tollefsen, 2002a; Tollefsen, 2002b; Tuomela & 
Miller, 1988;  Tuomela, 2004). Accordingly, epistemic group agents are in fact good 
candidates for qualifying as bearers of (collective) intentional states.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Consider Goldman’s (2004) attempt to explain Sandy Berger’s (former US national security adviser) mysterious 
dictum that “the F.B.I. didn’t know what it did know” about the 9/11 attack. Goldman claims that Berger refers to 
two different conceptions of the bureau. Under a summative conception of the agency as an aggregate of 
individual members, FBI did have knowledge of the attack, because certain agents individually possessed sufficient 
evidence, such that were this evidence to be put together, it would lead to a successful prediction of the attack. These 
individual agents, however, failed to appropriately combine their pieces of evidence in the right way meaning that 
the FBI, taken as a corporate or group entity, failed to know that the attack would take place.    
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 Similarly, turning to the topic of consciousness, objecting to group agency on its basis 
cannot be substantial enough. Consciousness is perhaps the most widely debated topic within 
philosophy of mind and cognitive science (see (Van Gulick, 2004) for an overview) and, as the 
problem of the ‘explanatory gap’ (Levine, 1983; McGinn, 1991; McGinn, 1989; Chalmers 
1996) suggests, most of it has proceeded on the basis of a priori conceptual analysis. In other 
words, consciousness is a topic that is far from understood, severely compromising any 
attempt to settle further debates on its basis. Not only that, but ‘consciousness’, as Block (2002, 
206) has put it, is actually a “mongrel concept” that can refer to several different types of 
things (e.g., ‘phenomenal consciousness’, ‘access consciousness’, ‘self-consciousness’, to name 
but a few), none of which can be guaranteed to be incompatible with the idea of group minds. 
In fact, not even phenomenal consciousness—i.e., the least likely type of consciousness to be 
possessed by groups—can provide a definitive verdict with respect to whether groups can 
have a mind of their own. Especially not, when prominent philosophers of mind (e.g., Block, 
2002; Chalmers 1996) insist on the conceptual possibility of philosophical zombies: i.e., 
entities with minds exactly like our own, but who lack phenomenal consciousness altogether. 
As Tollefsen (2006) summarizes the point:    
 
It is not clear [...] that one can settle what a mind is by a priori means or by reflecting on our 
experience as human minds. It is clear that human minds ‘‘feel’’ (at least some of the time) and 
that the zombies of philosophical thought do not. But it is not clear that minds without 
phenomenological experience are conceptually impossible. The fact that human minds feel 
and collective systems (and zombies) do not should not lead us to skepticism about the 
possibility of collective minds. Rather, we should conclude, as we do in the case of animal 
minds, that there are different sorts of minds.27 
 
 Of course, such a conclusion could hardly come as a surprise for many who work 
within philosophy of mind and cognitive science, where “minds that stop short of having the 
full range of properties that our minds have are commonplace. Newborn human infants, non-
human animals, and certain kinds of [sci-fi] machines are recognized as possessing such mind, 
manifesting only some of the psychological states or abilities characteristic of the minds of 
normal adult human beings” (Theiner & Wilson, 2013).  
 Characteristic of this trend is Wilson’s suggestion (2001b, p. 267) to make sense of 
mindedness ascriptions in such cases—as well as in cases where philosophers and cognitive 
scientists are willing to ascribe agency to groups (e.g., Theiner et al., 2010; Theiner & 
O’Connor, 2010; Theiner and Wilson, 2013; Barnier et al., 2008; Tollefsen, 2006; Wegner, 
1985; Wegner; 1986; Sutton, 2008)—on the basis of what he calls ‘minimal mindedness’: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 It is important to note, however, that, usually, philosophical zombies are not invoked to demonstrate that there 
can be minds that lack phenomenal consciousness. Their main role in the literature has been to demonstrate the 
shortcomings of physicalism: that is, that there can be creatures that are physically and behaviorally identical to us, 
but which nevertheless lack consciousness. Since, however, the standard description is that zombies “behave just 
like us, and some even spend a lot of time discussing consciousness” (Kirk, 2011), the assumption seems to be that 
zombies may well qualify as mindful, even though they are entirely void of consciousness.  
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X has a minimal mind, just in case X engages in at least one psychological process or has at 
least one psychological ability.28 
 
On the basis of this, however, and since groups can qualify as having the psychological ability 
to engage in group-justificatory processes, it transpires that groups, after all, can also qualify as 
possessing at least a minimal form of mind. 
 Therefore, we see that Giere’s common-sense psychological attempt to disallow 
groups from having minds in themselves is, to say the least, inconclusive. This should be 
welcome for mainstream epistemology, which now seems that it can safely ascribe knowledge 
to groups. Additionally, though, this may count as a positive result for anyone interested in 
group knowledge in general, for the alternative idea of ‘epistemology without a knowing 
subject’ appears to be a rather metaphysically unstable view: Since the existence of any given 
property is normally tightly associated with the existence of a corresponding system this 
property belongs to,29 how can we follow Giere in accepting the existence of a collective, 
epistemic, cognitive property—such as a collective belief-forming process/collective 
justification—in the absence of some epistemic, distributed cognitive system—i.e., an 
epistemic group agent—this property belongs to?30  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 One possible worry with the idea of minimal mindedness is that it may run the risk of being too liberal, 
depending on what may count as a psychological process or ability. At this point, employing a rather common 
tactic, Wilson responds without offering a definition. Instead, he attempts to ‘fix our ideas’ on the basis of the 
following incomplete but suggestive list of what may count as a psychological process or ability: “perception, 
memory, imagination (classical Faculties); attention, motivation, consciousness, decision-making, problem-solving 
(processes or abilities that are the focus of much contemporary work in the cognitive sciences); and believing, 
desiring, intending, trying, willing, fearing, and hoping (common, folk psychological states)” (Wilson 2001b, 266). 
Of course, it might still be objected that this is not an entirely successful approach to clarifying what may count as 
minimally mindful, as some of the most basic psychological processes and abilities listed above can be plausibly 
ascribed to systems whose mentality is rather dubious (for example, problem-solving or perceiving can be plausibly, 
even if metaphorically, ascribed to certain computers). Note, however, that this worry gradually fades away as we 
focus on more complicated psychological processes and abilities, such as imagining, decision-making, believing 
and, as in the present case, being justified.  Surely, any system that posses such complicated psychological traits 
should qualify as at least minimally mindful.  
29 Even though this claim may sound as presupposing substance metaphysics, the present paper draws on 
dynamical systems theory (see section 2.1), which should be a good indication that the present approach is rather 
sympathetic to the spirit and methodology of process philosophy (for an overview of the debate between substance 
metaphysics and process philosophy, see Seibt 2012). According to dynamical systems theory, however, properties 
cannot be conceptualized in the absence of the systems they belong to: Properties are behavioral regularities that arise out of 
processes of interactions between the components of a system. Accordingly, the present approach seems to be orthogonal to 
the debate between substance metaphysics and process philosophy as it does not ascribe metaphysical primacy to 
either substances or processes—an adequate description of reality requires both.     
30 Perhaps one way to do so is to follow Wilson (2001a; 2001b; 2004; 2005) who has attempted to propose such a 
deflated approach to social properties on the basis of what he calls the ‘social manifestation’ thesis: Collective 
psychological properties, whatever they are, are properties of individuals, no matter they can only be manifested 
insofar the relevant individuals constitute part of a social group. The problem, however, is that Wilson’s insistence 
on the bearers of such collective properties being exclusively individuals is a form of favoritism towards 
individualism. Specifically, Wilson derives his social manifestation thesis from what he calls (a) wide and (b) 
radically wide realization: Respectively, the ideas that the total (in the case of (a)) and core (in the case of (b)) 
realization of certain properties is at least partly located outside the individual who possesses the relevant property 
(2001a). However, when Wilson is pressed to explain why the bearers of such properties are not themselves wide 
but are, instead, exclusively individuals, all he offers by way of an explanation are a few remarks to the effect that 
either the core realizers of the relevant property are realized in large part—even if not wholly—by the activity of the 
individual, or that individuals, in general, must stand out in our explanations, because they “are spatio-temporally 
bounded, relatively cohesive, unified entities that are continuous across space and time” (Wilson, 2001a, p. 24). 
Since, however, in the case of distributed cognition the relevant collective properties are radically wide, realized by 
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 Of course, in return, this point may generate the objection that even if we accept, on 
the present view, that there is an overall cognitive system such a collective belief-forming 
process belongs to, it is not clear whether such a system can qualify as an epistemic group agent in 
itself. Given the preceding discussion with respect to common-sense psychology, however, 
there is no promising rationale to motivate the denial of cognitive agency to such a distributed 
cognitive system. This leaves the ascription of epistemic group agency, in particular, as being 
the only remaining cause for concern. Again, however, there is no principled reason to deny 
the relevant collective cognitive system the status of an epistemic group agent in itself. As noted 
in §3.2, according to virtue reliabilism, epistemic agency is a rather weak notion that manifests 
itself in the actions of initiating, sustaining, and monitoring the relevant belief-forming 
process. Specifically, according to virtue reliabilism, epistemic agency is manifested in the 
following weak, (epistemically) externalist sense of epistemic responsibility: If there is something 
wrong with the relevant belief-forming process then the agent will be able to spot this and 
respond appropriately, otherwise—if there is nothing wrong—the agent can be by default 
responsible (i.e., subjectively justified (Palermos 2014b)) in employing the relevant belief-
forming process and its resulting beliefs without even being aware that he does so or that the 
process is reliable. Accordingly, it is not at all obvious why one should deny epistemic agency to 
a collective cognitive system either: After all, it is the assembly of the individual members of 
the group as a whole that initiates and sustains the relevant collective belief-forming process 
and it is the same assembly operating as a whole that is responsible for it: It is the participating 
members’ reciprocal interactions—which bind them together into a unified whole—that allow 
their cognitive ensemble to effectively be in a position to respond appropriately in cases where 
there might be something wrong with some part of the overall process. 
 One possible worry, however, is that the above notion of collective epistemic 
responsibility (and agency) may be too weak. Specifically, it may seem too liberal, because it 
may allow individuals who would normally not count as parts of a research team to actually 
qualify as proper parts of the overall group that is collectively responsible and creditable for 
the final scientific findings. Imagine, for example, a group that is made up of both lab 
technicians and scientists conducting a scientific experiment. Before and during the 
experiment the technicians causally interact continuously and reciprocally with the scientists 
in ways that are directly relevant to the experiment. They attend to the operation and 
maintenance of the equipment, teach the scientists how to use it, and continually monitor the 
operation of the machinery. Accordingly, given dynamical systems theory and virtue 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the activity of all the contributing individuals operating in tandem, and since distributed cognitive systems are spatio-
temporally bounded, cohesive, unified wholes in themselves, none of these explanations is satisfactory. In fact, even 
Wilson himself seems to admit as much: “In at least some cases of wide realization, particularly those of radically 
wide realization, there is [no] non-arbitrary way to single out individuals as the subjects or ‘owners’ of the 
corresponding mental properties. If we have wide realizations of mental states, and thus wide mental states, so too 
we should have ‘wide subjects’ of those states” (ibid., p. 24).     
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reliabilism, the technicians count as proper parts of the distributed cognitive system/epistemic 
group agent that conducts the experiment.  
 Nevertheless—as the objection may further go—it may seem counterintuitive to claim 
that the technicians form proper parts of the same epistemically responsible network that 
includes the scientists of the team: The technicians do not fully understand or endorse the 
scientific findings (even though they have played a significant causal role in their production); 
and even if they are duly mentioned in the final paper, they do not assume any of the 
epistemic rights, duties and responsibilities that we normally associate with the scientists (e.g., 
to defend the collectively produced scientific findings if they are appropriately challenged).  
 In response, one practical reason to resist the above intuitions may be the thought 
experiment itself. It is rather implausible that scientific groups are organized in the way 
presented above: Lab technicians usually perform only mundane tasks and work under the 
supervision of senior scientists. Moreover, it is doubtful that scientists do not know how their 
equipment works; many times they have to modify or even assemble their equipment 
themselves and, in any case, it is implausible that they may rely on apparatus that they do not 
know how to operate or when it is likely to malfunction. Despite these practicalities, however, 
an important point that the present approach can bring to light is that if there indeed are 
experiments to which lab technicians contribute in the way specified by the thought 
experiment above, then perhaps the relevant lab technicians should not only be ‘duly 
mentioned’ in the final publication. After all, no one individually understands or is able to 
defend—not even the principal scientific investigators themselves—the scientific findings that 
have been collectively produced by the research team: The justification for the final result was 
produced by the group (including the technicians) as a whole and no individual (either a 
technician or a scientist) could recreate it on his/her own. The point of distributed cognition 
and epistemic group agency is—precisely—to accentuate the distributed nature of the 
cognitive achievement and the credit that comes with it: Whoever has constitutively contributed 
to the production of the final result should count as part of the team that is epistemically 
creditable for it, independently of title, position or any other social status. This may run 
against current scientific practice, but it is a claim that seems quite plausible in itself, and 
which perhaps should be taken into serious consideration when shaping future science 
policies.31   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Alternatively, if one does not agree with this claim, it is possible to explain why lab technicians fail to form 
proper parts of the epistemic subject that deserves epistemic credit for the final piece of knowledge—despite 
qualifying as proper parts of the cognitive systems that gave rise to it—by complementing the above virtue 
reliabilist approach with the collective intentionality approach to group knowledge (Gilbert, 2007a, 2007b, 2010; 
List & Pettit, 2006; List, 2011; Rolin, 2008): The lab technicians are not jointly committed to accepting or 
endorsing the result of the experiment and so they are not epistemically responsible or creditable for it. It should be 
noted, however, that, at least on certain formulations (e.g., Rolin 2008), the collective intentions approach to 
collective knowledge gives rise to collective epistemic responsibility in the robust sense of having the capacity to 
monitor and adjust one’s epistemic states in accordance with norms of rationality. In other words, at least certain 
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 In closing this section then, we see that if we remain open-minded with respect to the 
widely debated topic of what properties are required for a system to qualify as a mind—as 
well as whether such properties can have collective counterparts—or, simply, follow 
philosophers of mind and cognitive scientists who are regularly willing to ascribe at least a 
minimal degree of mindedness to groups (just as they may do with infants, animals, or even 
certain kinds of futuristic machines), we are in a position to provide a plausible metaphysical 
and epistemological explanation of what the subjects of group knowledge might be. 
Otherwise, the cost to be incurred is that mainstream epistemology will remain at a loss about 
how to account for knowledge that is collectively produced, with the only possible alternative 
being ‘epistemology without a knowing subject’, whose proponents are yet to provide it with 
both an epistemological and metaphysical support.32 However formidable such an exercise 
may turn out to be, on the present approach we can simply claim that insofar as there is a 
collective belief-forming process, then it will belong to a group cognitive agent, who can 
qualify as an epistemically responsible agent in itself; and if believing the truth can only be 
attributed to the collection of the individual members of this epistemic group agent as a whole, 
then there is group knowledge too.   
 
5. CONCLUSION 
In §2, we went through the reasons why virtue reliabilism is particularly apt for an 
interpretation along the lines suggested by active externalism, and especially by the extended 
and distributed cognition hypotheses. §3 explored how scientific theories can be viewed as 
software artifacts that allow the individual scientist to extend her cognitive character beyond 
her organismic belief-forming processes, and §4 was dedicated to how research teams can be 
viewed as epistemic group agents that exist and gain knowledge on the basis of non-reducible, 
distributed cognitive abilities. 
The upshot is that, if correct, the above analysis provides an account of knowledge 
that seems applicable to a disparate variety of cases, despite the fact that knowledge can be 
attained in a multitude of fundamentally different ways. That is, by suggesting that 
knowledge-conducive belief-forming processes can take the form of either software or 
hardware, individual or social, cognitive artifacts of some corresponding epistemic individual 
or group agent allows for abstracting sufficiently away from irrelevant considerations of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
formulations of the collective intentionality approach to group knowledge may be epistemically internalist in spirit 
and as such they may run counter the spirit of virtue reliabilism, which is an epistemically externalist approach to 
both individual and group knowledge. Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting this alternative as well as for 
proposing the thought experiment and objection discussed in the above three paragraphs.  
32 The collective intentionality approach to collective knowledge (Gilbert, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2010, Rolin 2008, 
List 2011, Wray 2007; Tuomela 2004) is not here considered as an alternative, since it does not focus on 
knowledge that is collectively produced, but only on knowledge being collectively possessed. But, even if there were a 
story for such an approach to tell with respect to knowledge that is collectively produced, there would still be way 
more to tell about how such a story would fit within contemporary epistemology.  
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physical implementation. In this way, we can group vision, reasoning, memory, telescopic 
observation, scientific theories and even research teams together, providing in effect a unified 
theory of knowledge that seems able to account for many different (all?) aspects of our 
individual and social epistemic nature.33  
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